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Solving the Procedural Quagmire for 
Testing Reverse Payment Settlements 
Richard McMillan, Jr., Mary Bram & M. Brinkley 
Tappan* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Patent disputes between branded and generic drug 
manufacturers governed by the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (“the Hatch-Waxman 
Act”)1 are often settled under terms that contemplate some 
payment of money by the branded firm in exchange for the 
generic firm’s agreement to withdraw wholly or partially from 
the market. For years, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
has attempted to label these “reverse payment settlements” as 
anticompetitive under Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act2 and Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 3 
Such settlements have also been attacked in Congress; 
legislation has been introduced to prohibit reverse payment 
settlements on grounds that they retard the growth of less 
expensive generic drugs and increase health care costs for 
American consumers.4 Most recently, the Department of 
                                                          
 2010 Richard McMillan, Jr., Mary Bram & M. Brinkley Tappan. 
* Richard McMillan, Mary Bram and Brinkley Tappan practice law in 
Washington, D.C. The opinions expressed in this article are their own, and are 
not offered on behalf on any other firm or organization. In addition, the views 
expressed are based upon U.S. legal principles, and therefore may not be 
applicable in jurisdictions outside the United States, such as in the European 
Union. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
355 and 35 U.S.C. 271(e) (2006)). 
 2. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
 3. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006). According to FTC Commissioner Jon 
Leibowitz, “[e]liminating these pay-for-delay settlements is one of the most 
important objectives for antitrust enforcement in America today.” Jacqueline 
Bell, FTC, Calif. Launch Reverse Payment Challenge, LAW360, Feb. 3, 2009. 
 4. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. (as 
introduced, February 3, 2009). 
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Justice (DOJ), in response to invitation by the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, has endorsed the proposition that 
reverse payment settlements should be deemed presumptively 
unlawful under a Section 1 rule of reason analysis, and 
permitted only in rare circumstances.5 
Courts to date have largely rejected these criticisms. 
Practical-minded judges, even while expressing concerns 
regarding the risks posed by reverse payment settlements, 
have recoiled from the daunting prospect of probing the 
justifications for intricate settlements of complex patent 
disputes. Instead, courts have generally defaulted to the 
proposition that patent law, which contemplates legal 
monopolies by patent holders, should trump inconsistent 
antitrust concerns.6 Government enforcement agencies, on the 
other hand, have continued to press their case that reverse 
payment settlements presumptively violate antitrust laws, but 
have yet to propose a meaningful set of procedures for how a 
rule of reason analysis should proceed in such circumstances or 
how any such presumption might be overcome. 
The state of this debate is unsatisfactory because it has 
tended to be framed by two extremes—those proposing 
presumptive validity and those proposing presumptive 
invalidity, with neither side proposing attractive methods for 
assessing the presumption or appropriate standards for 
rebutting the presumption. More sensible treatment of reverse 
payment settlements might be possible if the courts were able 
to settle on a thoughtful and effective method for applying 
antitrust scrutiny to these types of settlements, but to date, a 
suitable formula has proven elusive. 
As a matter of theory, there is credible cause for antitrust 
concern. Within the framework of Hatch-Waxman in which 
these settlements occur, there are substantial incentives that 
tend to encourage reverse payment settlements between 
                                                          
 5. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation at 9–
10, 19–32, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer, AG, No. 05-2851-
cv(L) (2d Cir. July 6, 2009) [hereinafter DOJ Brief]. 
 6. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 202 
(2d Cir. 2006).  More recently, however, the Second Circuit has indicated a 
willingness to revisit the issue of how to balance antitrust and patent law in 
connection with reverse payment settlements. See Ark. Carpenters Health & 
Welfare Fund v. Bayer, AG, No. 05-2851-cv(L), 2010 WL 1710683, at *7 (2d 
Cir. Apr. 29, 2010). 
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branded and generic firms even when there will be negative 
impacts on competition and consumers. The branded company 
is defending “monopoly” profits, and thus has a huge incentive 
not to put that monopoly at risk by seeing the case through to a 
judgment that could potentially invalidate the patent. By 
comparison, the generic firm—whose entry into the market will 
predictably drive down prices—often anticipates lower 
profitability as a result and thus more limited upside 
opportunity. Accepting a slice of the branded company’s 
monopoly profits in settlement entails less risk then a full-
fledged market entry while still guaranteeing the generic some 
substantial return on investment. As courts and commentators 
have recognized, it is foreseeable that in some cases it would 
even be in the branded company’s self-interest to offer the 
generic a reverse payment higher than the total economic 
benefit the generic might hope to achieve by successfully 
entering the market.7 
The fact that a reverse payment settlement may be in the 
self-interest of the two participants does not, of course, 
automatically dispose of antitrust concerns. Indeed, any 
“contract, combination . . . or conspiracy”8 that runs afoul of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act will typically have been perceived 
by participants to be in furtherance of their mutual self-
interest. That is usually the reason for the agreement in the 
first place. But while parties to a reverse payment agreement 
might be well satisfied, it is relatively easy to imagine 
circumstances in which consumers—the intended beneficiaries 
of antitrust law—would not be. 
Yet the perceived obstacles to addressing this dilemma 
remain unresolved. The bedeviling factors continue to be the 
myriad possible fact patterns in which the reverse payment 
concept might be used and the seeming unworkability of 
assessing the real thought processes that motivated the 
agreement in any particular instance. Faced with their own 
                                                          
 7. If a reverse payment settlement exceeds the profit the generic hoped 
to realize, but is still substantially below the profit that the branded firm 
hopes to maintain, it could be in the branded firm’s self-interest to offer such a 
settlement and in the generic’s self-interest to accept it.  See DOJ Brief, supra 
note 5, at 5 (quoting In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 
209 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also, Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment 
Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 489, 503 (2007). 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
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inability to define rules flexible enough to deal with the diverse 
fact patterns that are encountered, and their own reluctance to 
second-guess the motivations of parties who agree to settle 
complex litigation, courts to date have defaulted either to the 
position of essentially declaring a pox on all reverse payments 
(by labeling them per se illegal),9 or throwing up their hands by 
declaring all disputes within the “exclusionary zone of the 
patent” off limits to antitrust scrutiny.10 But while either the 
per se or “zone of exclusion” approaches may have the 
questionable benefit of allowing courts to avoid becoming mired 
in the hard work of careful antitrust analysis, neither does 
justice to the clear need for such analysis in appropriate cases. 
This article proposes a middle ground between these two 
extremes. We believe the courts should look more seriously at 
the reverse payment scenario, but should do so with a set of 
existing and established tools that would allow effective 
scrutiny of reverse payment settlements without unduly 
chilling the desirability of such settlements in some 
circumstances. This would require recognition by litigants that 
their own litigation case assessments may be open to scrutiny, 
to the extent permitted under normal discovery procedures, if 
the parties choose the reverse payment method of settlement. 
At the core of this proposal is the need for courts to sanction 
these discovery tools to examine the actual settlement analyses 
and thought processes of the litigants in reaching their 
settlement. Such examination allows the most accurate 
assessment of the real motivations driving the settlement and 
is the only way to avoid the impossible task of undertaking a de 
novo study of a complex patent dispute and second-guessing the 
litigants’ own assessments of that dispute through an 
independent jury trial. 
While it may seem worrisome to some that a party’s 
settlement communications may be discoverable in an antitrust 
challenge to a reverse payment settlement, current discovery 
and evidentiary principles, if properly applied, should already 
provide adequate protection to the settlement parties. Litigants 
can have no valid expectation that the communications 
                                                          
 9. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th 
Cir. 2003). 
 10. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 
1323, 1333–36 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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between them are always privileged from antitrust analysis. 
While Federal Rule of Evidence 408 limits admissibility in 
some circumstances, this bar is not absolute.11 Moreover, in 
some extreme cases, even internal communications within one 
party or the other may be subject to evaluation under 
exceptions to rules governing attorney-client privilege. 
II.  REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS: A BY-PRODUCT 
OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT 
Reverse payment settlements occur in pharmaceutical 
patent infringement litigation when a patent owner of a 
pioneer drug and a generic drug manufacturer settle the suit by 
agreement that the generic company will cease or delay market 
entry of its generic in exchange for a settlement payment from 
the pioneer. Generally, the terms of the settlement also allow 
the patent owner to preserve the validity of the patents at issue 
in the infringement suit and both the patent owner and the 
generic drug manufacturer avoid further costly litigation. The 
Hatch-Waxman Act provides the regulatory context under 
which reverse payment settlements arise. 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic drug 
manufacturer seeking approval of its generic drug by the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) can file an Abbreviated New 
Drug Application (ANDA).12 The ANDA requires that the 
generic manufacturer demonstrate bioequivalence between its 
generic drug and an FDA-approved pioneer drug.13 
Additionally, the ANDA requires that if there are potentially 
relevant patents that will not have expired as of the anticipated 
market entry date, the generic manufacturer must certify to its 
belief that such patents are “invalid or not infringed by the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug.”14 This 
certification is called a “Paragraph IV Certification,” and is 
deemed an act of infringement that can be challenged by the 
pioneer in court.15 
The generic manufacturer must notify the patent owner of 
                                                          
 11. FED. R. EVID. 408. 
 12. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (West 1999 & Supp. 2009). 
 13. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
 14. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
 15. Mona Gupta & William C. Youngblood, High-Stakes ANDA 
Pharmaceutical Litigation and Paragraph IV Challenges, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY SUPPLEMENT TO THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, April 21, 2008. 
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its Paragraph IV Certification. The patent owner then has 
forty-five days to bring a patent infringement suit against the 
generic manufacturer.16 If suit is filed, FDA approval of the 
ANDA is postponed for either thirty months from the 
notification date or until, within the thirty- month period, a 
court issues a decision regarding validity or infringement of the 
patent.17 
Paragraph IV Certification is attractive to generic 
manufacturers because the first ANDA filer receives a 180 day 
exclusivity period within which it is the only company allowed 
to market the generic drug.18 Notified patent owners usually 
bring suit, however, and most often settle with the first ANDA 
filer. Those settlements typically take one of two forms: (1) the 
generic pays some amount to the patent owner, albeit perhaps 
less than the patent owner originally demanded, and proceeds 
to enter the market; or (2) the patent owner pays some amount 
to the generic, in exchange for the generic’s agreement to delay 
market entry (the so-called “reverse payment” scenario). In the 
former case, the settlement is justified on normal grounds, 
namely, it resolves uncertainty regarding the patent rights and 
avoids the potentially enormous cost and time associated with 
litigation. In the latter case, however, the assertion of patent 
rights by the branded firm was not sufficient to prevent market 
entry by the generic. Rather, it took the assertion of patent 
rights plus some payment of money to secure that result. The 
issue is whether that payment, together with the remaining 
terms of settlement, fairly addresses not only the private 
interests of the litigants but also the public interests and 
requirements of both patent and antitrust law. 
III.  ANTITRUST SCRUTINY OF REVERSE PAYMENT 
SETTLEMENTS 
Reverse payment settlement agreements commonly attract 
antitrust scrutiny from private plaintiffs or government 
regulators, and sometimes both. Given that a generic drug is, 
by definition, comparable to the pioneer drug with regard to 
“dosage form, strength, route of administration, quality, 
                                                          
 16. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Gupta & Youngblood, supra note 15. 
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performance characteristics and intended use,”19 there is no 
question that a generic drug competes with a name-brand drug 
when introduced to the market. Such competition has the 
potential to reduce prices and benefit consumers. When the 
possible introduction of a generic drug is forestalled by a 
confidential settlement between two competing drug 
companies, consumers may become naturally suspicious, if the 
pioneer remains the only seller in the market and/or prices 
remain higher than they would have had the two companies 
been forced to compete for sales. Although these settlements 
have been attracting antitrust scrutiny for years, the courts 
have not developed a common analytical approach. 
On one side of the current debate regarding the 
appropriate form of analysis is the Sixth Circuit’s seminal 
opinion in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation.20 In that 
case, the Court found the reverse payment settlement at issue 
to be per se unlawful.21 The court found the agreement “a 
horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market 
for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a classic 
example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”22 
One distinguishing feature of Cardizem, however, was that 
the generic agreed not to introduce products that fell outside 
the scope of the patent, and the case has been distinguished on 
that basis.23 No other appellate court to date has followed the 
Sixth Circuit. Rather, a new trend has developed in favor of an 
analysis of the “exclusionary zone” of the patent. In Valley 
Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, the Eleventh Circuit 
refused to uphold the district court’s characterization of the 
settlement agreement as per se illegal because a patent was 
involved.24 Noting that a patent provides a lawful right to 
exclude and that the exclusionary right may be exercised in 
many ways, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court 
                                                          
 19. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA): Generics, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelop
edandApproved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDA
Generics/default.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2010). 
 20. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 21. Id. at 900. 
 22. Id. at 908. 
 23. Holman, supra note 7, at 545–46 (2007). 
 24. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th 
Cir. 2003). 
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erred in failing to consider the “exclusionary power” of the 
patent at issue.25 
Two cases in 2005 provided further traction for the 
“exclusionary zone” analysis. In In re Tamoxifen Citrate 
Antitrust Litigation, the Second Circuit professed to apply a 
rule of reason analysis to balance (1) the adverse effect on 
competition; (2) the pro-competitive “redeeming virtues” of the 
action; and (3) whether the same pro-competitive benefit could 
have been achieved through other means.26 Although the trial 
court that heard the initial stage of the underlying patent 
litigation held Astra-Zeneca’s patent invalid,27 the Second 
Circuit refused to presume invalidity and afforded great 
deference to the power of the patent throughout its analysis.28 
Noting that the settlement agreement had not exceeded the 
“exclusionary zone” of the patent by affecting other products, 
foreclosing completely competition in the tamoxifen market, or 
barring other generics from seeking to enter the market, the 
court attributed any adverse effects to the power of the patent, 
rather than to an anticompetitive agreement between Astra-
Zeneca and Barr.29 On that basis, it upheld the decision of the 
trial court dismissing the case. 
In Schering-Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 
the Eleventh Circuit declined to apply a traditional per se or 
rule of reason analysis, opting to follow Valley Drug by 
examining “(1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the 
patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that 
scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.”30 Once 
again, the court paid great deference to the power of the patent, 
and justified each term of the settlement on those grounds. 
The “exclusionary zone” analysis was most recently 
adopted by the Federal Circuit in In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation.31 In that case, plaintiffs 
                                                          
 25. Id. at 1306. 
 26. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 385 n.13 
(2d Cir. 2005), amended by 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 27. Id. at 386. 
 28. Id. at 392–93 & n.22. 
 29. See id. at 403. 
 30. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir. 
2003)). 
 31. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 
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argued on appeal that the district court had failed to apply a 
proper rule of reason analysis because of its emphasis on the 
“exclusionary zone” of the patent.32 In response, the Federal 
Circuit stated that “the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate 
that the Agreements had an anti-competitive effect on the 
market for ciprofloxacin beyond that permitted by the 
patent.”33 It therefore concluded that it was unnecessary to 
proceed to the second and third steps of the rule of reason 
analysis, because plaintiffs failed to meet their burden in 
showing anti-competitive effects.34 The court rejected plaintiffs’ 
assertion that a proper rule of reason analysis should focus on 
the amount of the reverse payment and the strength of the 
underlying patent, and adopted the “exclusionary zone” 
reasoning espoused by the Second and Eleventh Circuits.35 On 
that basis, it affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ 
claims. 
Most recently, however, the Second Circuit has indicated a 
possible willingness to revisit its holding in Tamoxifen. In 
Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer (a 
companion case to the Cipro litigation in the Federal Circuit),36 
the court requested briefing by DOJ.37 DOJ responded by 
suggesting that the court revisit its earlier holding, and quoted 
extensively from that holding. In particular, DOJ noted that in 
Tamoxifen, the Court had observed that if the patent is found 
invalid, “the total profits of the patent holder and the generic 
manufacturer on the drug in the competitive market will be 
lower than the total profits of the patent holder alone under a 
patent-conferred monopoly.”38 Accordingly, it is “therefore 
likely to be in the patent holder’s economic interest ‘to pay 
some portion of that difference to the generic manufacturer to 
maintain the patent monopoly market for itself,’” particularly if 
the payment is “larger than the generic drug firm’s expected 
                                                          
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 32. Id. at 1331. 
 33. Id. at 1332. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1334–1335. 
 36. No. 05-2851-cv(L), 2010 WL 1710683 (2d Cir. Apr. 29, 2010). 
 37. See DOJ Brief, supra note 5. 
 38. Id. at 5 (quoting In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 
187, 209 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
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gain from litigating the validity issue.”39 
DOJ then proposed that all reverse payment settlements 
be considered presumptively unlawful, but that the parties be 
permitted to overcome the presumption by showing “a 
reasonable explanation of the payment, so that there is no 
reason to find that the settlement does not provide a degree of 
competition reasonably consistent with the parties’ 
contemporaneous evaluations of their prospects of litigation 
success.”40 DOJ characterized this as just the straightforward 
application of a rule of reason analysis of competitive impacts.41 
But because, under DOJ’s formulation, the analysis would be 
tied to “the parties’ contemporaneous evaluations of their 
prospects of litigation success,”42 it presents a conundrum for 
how it could best be applied. 
After receiving the input from DOJ, the Second Circuit 
recently affirmed the reverse payment settlement at issue in 
Bayer, proclaiming itself bound by the analysis in Tamoxifen.43 
However, it expressly invited the plaintiffs to seek review en 
banc, in light of the “exceptional importance” of the antitrust 
implications of “reverse exclusionary payment settlements.”44  
Hinting that further reshaping of the law may be required, the 
panel suggested there were “compelling reasons to revisit 
Tamoxifen.”45 Thus, weaknesses in the prevailing “exclusionary 
zone” analysis may yet auger some further evolution of the law, 
and if the Second Circuit does change course en banc, the issue 
may well reach the Supreme Court.46 
                                                          
 39. Id. at 5–6 (quoting Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 
209). 
 40. Id. at 10. 
 41. Id. at 9–10. 
 42. Id. at 10. 
 43. Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer, AG, No. 05-2851-
cv(L), 2010 WL 1710683, at *5, *7–8 (2d. Cir. Apr. 29, 2010). 
 44. Id. at *1. 
 45. Id. at *8. 
 46. Bayer was a companion case to the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re 
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 
2008), and a new direction by the Second Circuit would could well trigger a 
conflict between the circuits that would be appropriate for Supreme Court 
review. 
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IV.  WEAKNESSES OF THE “EXCLUSIONARY ZONE” 
ANALYSIS 
As an analytic tool, the “exclusionary zone” analysis suffers 
from numerous drawbacks. First, it tends to be almost entirely 
circular. There is no “exclusionary zone” of an invalid patent. 
Rather, the “exclusionary zone” of a patent is by definition 
dependent upon whether the patent is valid—the very issue 
disputed in the underlying infringement case but assumed in 
an “exclusionary zone” analysis. 
Moreover, at issue in an antitrust challenge to a reverse 
payment settlement are not the rights arising from the patent 
but the rights arising from a private settlement agreement. 
That agreement is a contract, a typical object of antitrust 
scrutiny. Contract law does not allow parties to resurrect an 
otherwise invalid patent and make it valid. As the DOJ 
explained in its brief to the Second Circuit in Bayer, the Patent 
Act “offers the patentee a choice between exercising its 
statutory privilege to protect its interests through litigation to 
enforce the patent—with the attendant risk that the patent 
may be invalidated—and relying on private measures that 
avoid the risk of patent invalidation but provide no antitrust 
immunity.”47 By essentially presuming patent validity, courts 
applying an “exclusionary zone” analysis are saying that if 
there is any possibility that the settlement is justified by patent 
rights, then the whole antitrust inquiry must be scuttled. 
Despite its weaknesses, it is not difficult to understand 
why courts have embraced the “exclusionary zone” analysis as 
a lesser of evils. Nearly all courts and scholars acknowledge 
that because settlement agreements are generally to be 
encouraged in litigation, it would be inappropriate always to 
deem them per se unlawful under the antitrust laws.48 
                                                          
 47. DOJ Brief, supra note 5, at 14. 
 48. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 390–
391 (2d Cir. 2005), amended by 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006); Erica N. 
Anderson, Note, Schering the Market: Analyzing the Debate over Reverse-
Payment Settlements in the Wake of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 
and In re Tamoxifen Citrate Litigation, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1028–30 (2008) 
(discussing different scholarly approaches for dealing with reverse payment 
settlements). Moreover, even a rule of reason analysis is problematic, as some 
of these same commentators suggest. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 
402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005). Just as importantly, a rule of reason 
analysis could implicate the “trial within a trial” problem that so 
fundamentally is driving the courts toward the exclusionary zone approach. 
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However, when courts reject the black and white litmus test of 
a per se rule, they have found little to fall back on. The specter 
of a rule of reason analysis applied to highly technical patent 
litigation has proved daunting. Expressly or implicitly, courts 
have recoiled at the prospect that after a settlement meant to 
resolve complex patent litigation, they must oversee a process 
in which a jury wades back into the underlying merits of the 
same dispute (in a “trial within a trial”), and then proceeds to a 
further level of complexity analyzing antitrust concerns. At 
some level, the courts seem to be saying that considerations of 
practicality must play a role. 
The FTC and DOJ have even recognized these worries as 
legitimate, at least up to a point. The DOJ has specifically 
foresworn the need for a trial within a trial to determine patent 
validity: “Requiring a court to determine whether the patentee 
would have prevailed . . . would unduly complicate the 
litigation by requiring at least a mini-trial of the patent issue 
in the antitrust case, and likely more.”49 And yet, even DOJ 
offers no suggestions for how this “mini-trial” might be avoided. 
Rather, DOJ acknowledges that in most cases, the presumption 
that reverse payment settlements are invalid can be overcome 
only “by showing that the settlement preserved a degree of 
competition reasonably consistent with what had been expected 
if the infringement litigation went to judgment.”50 How this 
might be determined, however, is for the most part not 
addressed. 
There is a need for some procedural framework to assess 
the “but for” world avoided by the settlement, i.e., the issue of 
what would have been “expected if the infringement litigation 
went to judgment.”51 We believe there are established tools 
available for this task. Before analyzing these tools, however, 
we must first look more closely at what analysis should 
actually be required in order to properly assess the legality of a 
reverse payment settlement under the antitrust laws. 
                                                          
See infra text accompanying notes 56–58. 
 49. DOJ Brief, supra note 5, at 25–26 (internal citation omitted). 
 50. Id. at 30. 
 51. See id. 
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V.  THE ANALYTIC TEST FOR EVALUATING REVERSE 
PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 
While a complete ban of reverse payment settlements 
might appeal to antitrust purists, such a drastic measure is 
both unnecessary and undesirable. A complete ban would 
frustrate the general policy of courts to encourage settlements 
of protracted litigation. Reverse payment settlements help to 
manage legal costs and mitigate risk associated with jury trials 
in patent cases, while potentially bridging the gap in 
settlements that, particularly if made in the context of some 
broader arrangement, could offer pro-competitive benefits when 
considered overall. However, courts have found it extremely 
difficult to identify any suitable procedure by which reverse 
payment settlements could be effectively analyzed. Although 
the potential for antitrust abuse is recognized, the lack of a 
practical means for assessing this potential has stymied most 
courts to date. The problem has been noted, but the remedy has 
proven elusive. 
The comprehensive itemization of all factors that might 
affect a proper antitrust analysis of reverse payment 
settlements is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say 
that at least at a general level, rule of reason standards are 
well developed, and we are confident that courts could refine 
them with more specificity in the particular context of reverse 
payments as the cases progressed. The central difficulty, 
however, is that challenging a reverse payment settlement 
necessarily requires an analysis of the bona fides of that 
settlement. It is therefore worth at least some brief analysis of 
the kinds of issues that might be implicated in this 
environment. 
The touchstone of any rule of reason analysis is impact on 
competition. If courts, in response to the demands of 
government regulators, begin to look more closely at reverse 
payment settlements, touchstones may develop to facilitate the 
rule of reason analysis. A reverse payment in excess of the total 
profits the generic might have achieved if market entry had 
occurred might, for example, require particularly close 
scrutiny. Where the full terms and impact of settlement are 
less clear, however, courts have recognized the potential need 
to analyze the probability that extended litigation would have 
produced a more pro-competitive outcome (i.e., beneficial to 
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consumers) than the proposed settlement.52 This necessarily 
requires at least some evaluation of the parties’ potential 
prospects in the litigation, because it is the projected outcome 
of that litigation which defines the “but for” world to which the 
settlement must be compared. 
In addition, there must be some market and profitability 
analysis. A sensible rule of reason analysis would consider not 
only the scope of the patent rights, but also the profitability of 
the market in which those rights could be exercised. Both of 
these are facts that the parties would have considered 
themselves when they negotiated the settlement. Parties would 
not enter into a reverse payment settlement without assessing: 
(1) the strength of the patent; (2) the profit the generic would 
have earned had it entered the market; (3) the size of the 
reverse payment; and (4) any other terms of the settlement or 
conditions of the negotiation that would tend to affect the 
balance.53 
At least as a theoretical matter, the evaluation of these 
factors should permit a court to determine whether a reverse 
payment settlement was a reasonable conclusion to the 
underlying patent litigation, or whether it is indicative of a 
“pay-for-delay” agreement not justified by the merits of the 
patent. DOJ, for example, has stated that the presumption of 
unlawfulness would be overcome if the settlement provides “a 
degree of competition reasonably consistent with the parties’ 
contemporaneous evaluations of their prospects of litigation 
success.”54 
While seemingly straightforward, however, DOJ’s 
formulation masks hidden difficulties. These difficulties vary 
depending upon whether the generic’s market entry is 
completely prohibited or only delayed under the terms of 
settlement. A threshold question, for example, is whether a 
reverse payment settlement should ever be deemed reasonable 
if it allows no generic competition until the patent term has 
expired. One could imagine some limited circumstances where 
rule of reason standards might be satisfied—e.g., where both 
parties believed there was overwhelming evidence that the 
patent was valid and infringed and the reverse payment was 
                                                          
 52. See Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 429 F.3d at 386. 
 53. See, e.g., id. at 391–392; Anderson, supra note 48, at 1028–31. 
 54. DOJ Brief, supra note 5, at 10. 
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very low—but this would probably be the unusual case. 
We believe that in most cases, courts confronting reverse 
payment settlements will be able to identify at least some pro-
competitive features. Eventual entry by the generic may be 
permitted, or at minimum, the generic may be cross-licensed to 
sell some “generic” version of the branded firm’s product. In 
such circumstances, the inquiry will turn on the size of the 
reverse payment, the terms of market entry by the generic, and 
the likely litigation outcome had no settlement been reached. A 
sliding scale might be envisioned. At one end of that scale are 
cases involving perceptions by the parties of a high likelihood of 
patent validity, and relatively low reverse payment amounts. 
At the other end are weak patent rights, high monetary 
payments, and substantial foreclosure of market entry by the 
generic. 
Concrete examples help to illustrate. Assume for example 
that a settlement was premised on the conclusion, shared by 
both parties, that the underlying patent had a substantial 
likelihood (i.e., 75% or greater) of being upheld as valid. So long 
as any reverse payment was small relative to the projected 
profitability of the pioneer and generic, a settlement might 
seem justified. The generic under these facts was very unlikely 
to have achieved market entry through litigation, and the 
reverse payment amount might be found reasonable when 
considered in this context and against the fact that it offsets 
some potential litigation costs and business uncertainty risks 
associated with “irrational” litigation outcomes. This latter 
factor is frequently overlooked. Patent jury trials are often 
criticized for their unreliability,55 and settlements that 
overcome that unreliability when the parties have a shared 
view of the likely outcome should be respected. 
If, on the other hand, the pioneer came to the conclusion 
that the patent in all likelihood would be found invalid, and the 
pioneer then simply proceeded to buy the generic out of the 
market by paying it something close to what the generic would 
have obtained in profit by entering the market, antitrust 
review does seem appropriate. In that case, a hefty reverse 
payment would be tantamount to an acknowledgement that the 
pioneer had no real patent rights but rather could keep the 
                                                          
 55. See, e.g., Brad Stone, Blackberry Smackdown; Wrangling Over Patents 
Is Worrying Users and Investors, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 12, 2005, at 48. 
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generic out of the market only by paying the full value of the 
generic’s likely gain by entering the market. A court could 
conclude that this was not a reasonable settlement, but a 
straightforward “pay-for-delay” arrangement, and therefore, an 
antitrust violation. 
Analyzing specific examples is one thing. The texture and 
complexity of all possible reverse payment scenarios is quite 
another. It will not be unusual, for example, for the parties to 
have very different estimations of success, with perhaps each 
party believing it would be likely to prevail if the case 
ultimately went to trial. Profit estimates extending into the 
future might also be highly variable and disputed. There is no 
“formula” that will adequately measure all possibilities under 
all circumstances. Nor will courts ever be able to predict with 
certainty either the likely litigation outcome or the future 
market behavior. 
However, these precise factors will have been analyzed by 
both parties in reaching their settlement. Even though exact 
outcomes could not be known, the probabilities of all likely 
outcomes should have been assessed. As a matter of theory, it 
therefore seems neither unfair nor particularly difficult to 
compare the choices made in the settlement agreement with 
the actual beliefs that drove those choices. In fact, the 
subjective assessments of the parties, driven by detailed 
evaluation of the facts and law by knowledgeable counsel, may 
offer the most reliable tools for assessing the antitrust impacts 
of the agreement. 
While difficulties will remain under any approach, the 
courts should aspire to some solution to the largely unworkable 
“exclusionary zone” standard that most courts currently follow. 
The risks of reverse payment settlements are evident. The 
severe weaknesses of the “exclusionary zone” test are also 
evident. A new and better construct needs to be crafted. 
VI.  AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL 
Courts following the “exclusionary zone” rule have 
imagined that in the absence of a per se approach, analysis of 
the reasonableness of any particular settlement would 
necessarily mean becoming bogged down in a “trial within a 
trial.” Under such an imagined approach, the whole issue of 
whether the patent is valid has to be litigated (despite the 
settlement) in order to determine if the settlement was 
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reasonable.56 This would require claim construction, 
assessment of all prior art, evaluation of the range of other 
invalidating defenses, and potentially opening the issue of 
inequitable conduct before the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) as well. Most importantly, it would 
permit a jury to reach its own determination of these issues, 
thereby potentially second-guessing how either party to the 
litigation actually evaluated them in fact. This “trial within a 
trial” approach disregards entirely the benefits of settlement 
and the rights of parties to make their own judgments about 
which settlements are reasonable, and requires a full-scale 
vindication of those judgments before a lay jury. 
On closer analysis, however, we believe the real problem is 
not what to analyze, but how to make the analysis. Under our 
approach, the focus of the rule of reason analysis would be 
limited to how the parties themselves perceived and evaluated 
the underlying dispute, and determined the terms of 
settlement. A key benefit to this approach is that it would take 
into account a much smaller and potentially more reliable set of 
facts—namely, what the parties themselves believed and how 
they evaluated the settlement.57 
From an analytic perspective, the focus on the parties’ own 
assessments seems entirely appropriate. Litigants analyze 
their litigation positions in far more detail than any court could 
do in the span of a trial. In patent litigation, including the 
months leading up to the litigation, it is not uncommon for 
millions of dollars in legal and expert fees to be expended. This 
                                                          
 56. “In its decision that led to the Eleventh Circuit appeal in Schering-
Plough, the FTC concluded that ‘it would not be necessary, practical, or 
particularly useful for the Commission to embark on an inquiry into the 
merits of the underlying patent dispute when resolving antitrust issues in 
patent settlements.’” In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 
F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 
WL 22989651, slip op. at 19 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003)). 
 57. We do not intend to suggest that probing the parties’ settlement 
evaluations will be a simple exercise. Indeed, once it was understood that 
settlement intent could be evaluated in some circumstances, we would expect 
parties to adopt counter-measures to protect against potential discovery 
probes. Exchanges during the course of some settlement discussions may be 
guarded, and parties might be expected in any event to avoid incriminating 
statements in their documentation. But judicial procedures provide 
mechanisms for deciding upon appropriate discovery in these circumstances, 
and while some complexity will still be involved, we believe our approach 
offers enormous savings in both time and effectiveness. 
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purposely intensive analysis provides the most secure baseline 
for analyzing the real merits of the dispute. 
Although there is little doubt that the most thorough 
understanding of the facts of any particular dispute is often 
held by the litigants themselves, when the litigants settle, 
there ordinarily is a cloak of confidentiality that the litigants 
are entitled to rely upon to shield their settlement discussions 
from further scrutiny. In the reverse payment scenario, the 
trick then is to find a way that respects the legitimate rights of 
confidentiality, while still permitting some outside scrutiny 
where appropriate. 
Luckily, there is an already established set of tools in our 
court system that can provide this middle ground. In the 
approach outlined below, an antitrust plaintiff challenging a 
reverse payment settlement would proceed in a three-step 
fashion. First, it could gather publicly available information. 
Second, it could invoke the principles of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 408 during discovery, to obtain information about the 
settlement agreement.58 Finally, if the court had strong 
suspicions that there had indeed been an antitrust violation, it 
could allow the plaintiff to pursue privileged information about 
the settlement by invoking the crime-fraud exception to 
privilege. This would have to be done with care, however, and 
only in extraordinary circumstances, as discussed below. 
These steps should proceed seriatim. The Rule 408 inquiry 
would be best undertaken after the challenge to the reverse 
payment settlement had been framed by publicly available 
information, when the exact purpose for the Rule 408 inquiry 
could be defined on the basis of such information. Similarly, 
invocation of the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client 
privilege would require a prima facie showing of wrongdoing (in 
this case, an alleged antitrust violation) that could be made out 
only if sufficiently probative facts had been uncovered from 
public information and the court-supervised Rule 408 inquiry. 
We analyze each of the three steps below. 
                                                          
 58. Rule 408 allows admission of evidence of compromise or offers to 
compromise when the evidence is offered for a purpose other than to prove 
“liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim that was disputed as to 
validity or amount, or to impeach through a prior inconsistent statement or 
contradiction.” FED. R. EVID. 408. 
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A.  PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION 
To learn more about the patent at the center of a 
settlement, plaintiffs in an antitrust challenge should first be 
required to look at public information available from several 
sources. First, the FDA publishes all approved generic and 
pioneer drugs in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations, also known as the Orange Book.59 
Pioneer drug entries identify relevant patents. The complaint 
in the underlying patent infringement case would also identify 
the patents alleged to have been infringed. Copies of the 
patents are obtained from the USPTO.60 
Evidence related to the strength of the patents is available 
in the prosecution histories of the patents. A prosecution 
history includes all of the papers filed by the Applicants and 
the USPTO during prosecution of the patent application. 
Importantly, the prosecution history includes all Office Actions 
issued by the USPTO and all amendments and responses to 
Office Actions filed by the Applicants. Office Actions could 
provide a basis upon which a patent could potentially be found 
invalid. Using this source, an antitrust plaintiff could ascertain 
at least some important facts concerning the likelihood of a 
patent’s validity and proffer evidence of patent invalidity. 
Depending on the point at which the pioneer and the 
generic settled, court filings in the underlying patent 
infringement case might also provide an antitrust plaintiff with 
detailed analysis regarding the validity of the patents at issue. 
This would be particularly true for cases that progressed to the 
point of summary judgment; motions at that phase of trial 
could present the best arguments for invalidity and validity, 
respectively. Thus, depending upon the progress of the case 
prior to settlement, an antitrust plaintiff might be able to 
access very useful evidence regarding the strength of the 
patents at issue. 
While a reverse payment settlement agreement is typically 
confidential, an antitrust plaintiff might also obtain details 
regarding the settlement agreement in annual reports filed by 
                                                          
 59. See OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE 
EVALUATIONS (2010), available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/eclink.cfm. 
 60. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Full-Text and 
Full-Image Databases, http://patft.uspto.gov/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). 
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public companies with the SEC. Such reports sometimes 
include the amount and frequency of payments from the 
pioneer drug company to the generic manufacturer, terms 
agreed to by the generic manufacturer in consideration for 
payment, and other ancillary agreements entered into at the 
time of the reverse payment settlement agreement. For 
example, in one of its annual reports, Barr Laboratories, Inc. 
(“Barr”) discussed its reverse payment settlement agreement 
with Bayer AG and Bayer Corporation (collectively “Bayer”), 
including the amount of the payment and the terms of a related 
supply agreement.61 
Court filings in a civil action initiated by the FTC or DOJ 
could also provide an antitrust plaintiff with evidence 
pertaining to the terms of the settlement, the beliefs of 
settlement participants regarding the settlement, product 
revenues and projections, the anticompetitive effects of the 
settlement, and other information. Although government 
regulators generally initiate non-public investigations in the 
first instance, if the pioneer drug company and generic 
manufacturer refuse to sign a consent order, the FTC has been 
willing to file an action in a U.S. district court seeking 
injunctive relief. In that case, some fruits of the non-public 
investigation become public. The FTC recently initiated such 
an action after a non-public investigation of a reverse payment 
settlement.62 
There may be a variety of additional information available 
as well, especially for important drugs.63 This might include 
press releases, trade publications, financial analyst reports, 
analyst calls with management, FDA dockets, and FTC 
reports.64 
                                                          
 61. Barr Labs., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K405) (Sept. 29, 1997), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/10081/0000950123-97-
008183.txt. 
 62. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 08-cv-
2141-RBS (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2008), available at 
ttp://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0610182/080213complaint.pdf. 
 63. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New 
Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 
646–47 (2009). 
 64. Id. 
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B.  INVOKING FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 408 DURING 
DISCOVERY 
Although a significant amount of information about a given 
settlement may be available in the public domain, it may be 
that this information by itself will be insufficient in many cases 
to fully resolve antitrust concerns. However, publicly available 
information should provide an appropriate baseline for seeking 
court approval of further discovery directed at the 
reasonableness of the settlement. This would be supervised 
under the strictures of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 408. Two sorts of 
materials could be sought—i.e., the settlement agreement 
documents themselves and communications between the 
parties concerning the settlement, including negotiations. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 allows for the admissibility of 
evidence of compromise negotiations, so long as the evidence is 
not offered to prove “liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a 
claim” that was the subject of the negotiations.65 The purpose of 
this stricture is to ensure that evidence of compromise cannot 
be admitted to prove the validity or invalidity of the underlying 
claim in a follow-on action to reassert or rely upon that claim.66 
In a follow-on antitrust action, however, it is not the validity or 
invalidity of the underlying claim that is at issue, but only the 
parties’ subjective perceptions of that claim. Those perceptions 
may be entirely in error, but the bona fides of the settlement 
for antitrust purposes would nevertheless turn on those 
perceptions, rather than the real merits, of the underlying 
claims. Discovery could therefore properly be limited to facts 
concerning the settlement agreement and negotiations bearing 
on whether or not the parties intended to affect an illegal 
restraint on trade.67 Discovery directed strictly toward whether 
there was a patent infringement would generally not be 
allowed. As one court has stated, evidence of compromise 
negotiations is likely to be admissible where “the settlement 
                                                          
 65. FED. R. EVID. 408. 
 66. See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note. 
 67. See id. The advisory committee provides examples of courts admitting 
evidence of an insurer’s settlement offer to prove the insurer’s bad faith, id. 
(citing Athey v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 234 F.3d 357, 362 (8th Cir. 2000)), and 
finding Rule 408 “inapplicable when the claim is based upon a wrong . . . 
committed during the course of settlement negotiations,” id. (citing 
Uforma/Shelby Bus. Forms, Inc. v. NLRB, 111 F.3d 1284, 1293 (6th Cir. 1997). 
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communications at issue arise out of a dispute distinct from the 
one for which the evidence is being offered.”68 
The court would nevertheless retain a gate-keeping role in 
assessing this issue. Thus, an antitrust plaintiff should be 
required, based on public information, to demonstrate some 
reasonable basis for its antitrust theory, and be able to explain 
the specific features of the settlement negotiations that require 
discovery in order to substantiate that claim. Courts evaluating 
the admissibility of evidence under Rule 408, for example, often 
examine not only the purpose for which the party seeks to 
admit the evidence, but whether admission of the evidence 
would undermine the policy behind Rule 408, which is to avoid 
chilling settlement negotiations.69 In a case in which one party 
sought to admit evidence from a mediation to establish the 
amount in controversy for federal jurisdiction purposes, the 
court admitted such evidence.70 The court reasoned that 
“concern that one’s adversary will use statements during 
negotiation as proof of liability or wrongdoing, not concern that 
it will use them as proof of the amount in controversy, is the 
primary obstacle to forthright negotiation discussions.”71 
Similarly, admitting evidence of a settlement agreement 
between a pioneer and a generic manufacturer for purposes of 
an antitrust analysis of the settlement would be unlikely to 
chill settlement negotiations in an underlying patent 
infringement case. To the extent there was a chilling effect, it 
would most likely be manifested in extra care by the drug 
companies to avoid the kind of discussion that might raise 
antitrust concerns. Only companies that intended to effect an 
anti-competitive agreement would need to worry about such 
“chilling effects.” For this reason, admitting evidence of the 
settlement negotiations should be permissible under Rule 408. 
Passing muster under Rule 408 would entitle the antitrust 
plaintiff to discovery of non-privileged communications 
regarding the settlement. These communications would be a 
                                                          
 68. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Watts Indus., Inc., 417 F.3d 682, 689 (7th Cir. 
2005). 
 69. See, e.g., Affiliated Mfrs, Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 56 F.3d 521, 
526 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The policy behind Rule 408 is to encourage freedom of 
discussion with regard to compromise.”). 
 70. See Molina v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-04796 MMM (FMx), 2008 
WL 4447678 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008). 
 71. Id. at *13. 
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further source of potentially rich information by which the bona 
fides of the settlement could be evaluated. With the terms of 
the settlement agreement and underlying, non-privileged 
discussions exposed to discovery, the parties would be able to 
develop their arguments about the nature of the settlement, 
particularly on the basis of the amount of the reverse payment, 
the stage at which the parties settled, the length of the 
negotiations, and whether the generic is permitted to license 
technology or enter the market prior to the expiration of the 
pioneer’s patent. A reasonably rich antitrust analysis could be 
performed with this information, and an antitrust plaintiff 
whose case at this juncture was still based only on conjecture 
and suspicion should be entitled to go no further. However, if 
discovery of non-privileged settlement materials establishes a 
prima facie case of a potential antitrust violation, further 
inquiry will be appropriate, as discussed below. 
C.  USING THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION TO PRIVILEGE 
Rule 408 itself permits a government prosecutor (such as 
the DOJ or FTC) to utilize settlement agreements and 
negotiations for any purpose in connection with a criminal 
inquiry. Similarly, the law has long permitted confidentiality 
claims based on attorney-client privilege to be overcome if the 
communications were in furtherance of a crime or fraud.72 This 
“crime-fraud” exception is used sparingly, and should be. 
Nevertheless, if used with great care, it could hold benefits for 
evaluating reverse payment cases in which there appears to be 
prima facie evidence that the antitrust laws have been violated. 
The antitrust laws provide for both civil and criminal 
remedies, and intentional antitrust violations qualify as 
“criminal” for purposes of the common law crime-fraud 
exception to privilege.73 Therefore, an antitrust plaintiff could 
potentially use the crime-fraud exception to delve even more 
deeply into what the parties were really intending, by piercing 
the privilege between the settling companies and their 
attorneys. This would require some prima facie showing of 
criminal intent by the challenging party, but should not depend 
                                                          
 72. Auburn K. Daily & S. Britta Thornquist, Has the Exception Outgrown 
the Privilege?: Exploring the Application of the Crime-Fraud Exception to the 
Attorney-Client Privilege, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 583, 584 (2003). 
 73. See In re Burlington N., Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 524–525 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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upon whether actual criminal charges have in fact been 
brought by antitrust enforcement authorities. To establish its 
basis for invocation of crime-fraud, a plaintiff would be 
required to undertake a two-part showing. First, the plaintiff 
must convince the court to undertake an in camera review of 
the documents in question. This requires a factual showing 
“adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person 
. . . that in camera review . . . [might] reveal evidence to 
establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies.”74 
Second, the court may order production of otherwise 
privileged documents on the basis of in camera review, but only 
if it finds that a prima facie antitrust violation has been made 
out.75 Moreover, only those documents found to have been 
written “in furtherance” of that violation will be ordered to be 
produced.76 Under this procedure, therefore, the court retains 
considerable discretion as to whether the privilege should be 
pierced, and what specific communications should be produced. 
We recognize that the very suggestion that the crime-fraud 
exception could play a meaningful role here will strike some 
readers as extreme. But it should not. First, under our 
proposal, the court would never get to a crime-fraud analysis 
unless and until the antitrust plaintiff had demonstrated a real 
basis for its claim. Suspicions or even “possible” inferences 
would not be enough. The crime-fraud case law requires that 
the plaintiff demonstrate a prima facie case that, as applied 
here, the antitrust laws have been violated. Because this 
violation must be criminal in nature to trigger the crime-fraud 
exception, it necessarily has an intent element, and the prima 
facie case would require a demonstration of such intent.77 We 
presume that in most cases, this would be an extremely 
difficult hurdle to surmount. 
A plaintiff seeking to invoke the crime-fraud exception 
                                                          
 74. In re Ditropan XL Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 06-1761 JSW (EDL), 
2007 WL 3256208, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2007) (quoting United States v. 
Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989)). 
 75. See Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 241 F.R.D. 480, 489–490 (N.D. 
Ill. 2007). 
 76. Mark A. Thornhill et al., Peering into Lawyers’ Files: Prosecutors’ Use 
of the Crime or Fraud Exception 7 (2005) (unpublished paper presented to 
ABA Section of Natural Res., Envtl. & Energy Law), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/environ/committees/environcrimes/thornhill.pdf. 
 77. See Abbott Labs., 241 F.R.D. at 490. 
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thus faces a stiff burden requiring that it both exhausts less 
intrusive discovery tools and establishes the necessary showing 
of intent that would be the touchstone for any alleged criminal 
antitrust violation. A plaintiff seeking to invoke the crime-
fraud exception should first be required to review publicly 
available information and exhaust appropriate discovery tools 
permitted by Rule 408. Among other things, this may reveal 
important dimensions of the underlying settlement 
negotiations. While communications between a party and its 
attorney are generally privileged, communications between two 
opposing parties negotiating a settlement agreement generally 
are not, absent unusual circumstances.78 Discovery of such 
information could benefit either party. While a plaintiff will 
seek evidence of apparently conscious antitrust violations, 
defendants in many cases will be able to show that their 
negotiations focused on solutions that should not raise, and 
were not believed to raise, valid antitrust concerns. In the 
latter instance, the court would properly deny a plaintiff’s 
request for waiver of attorney-client privilege under the crime-
fraud exception. 
In the exceptional case where a basis for crime-fraud 
review does exist, there would be additional protections 
available by reason of the requirement that a judge first review 
evidence from the settlement negotiations in camera.79 Such 
evidence might include each company’s assessment of its 
litigation risks, advice from counsel about the likelihood of 
success based on the strength of the patent at issue, and 
assessments by each party of their potential gains or losses 
depending on the potential outcomes of the case. All of this 
evidence would allow a court to assess whether the parties 
reached a reasonable settlement based on the legitimate factors 
under consideration at the time, or whether the settlement was 
simply a veiled agreement by one party to stay out of the 
market in exchange for an unreasonable reverse payment. If 
                                                          
 78. See 1 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND 
WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 484 (5th ed. 2007). 
 79. In camera reviews are sometimes conducted by a judge other than the 
one presiding over the underlying case, to prevent prejudice to the producing 
party in the event the evidence does not meet the requirements for admission 
under the crime-fraud exception. Given that antitrust cases are commonly 
adjudicated through bench trials, it would be reasonable for a drug company to 
request that a separate judge review any evidence produced for in camera 
review. 
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the court was satisfied that the settlement was reasonable and 
legitimate, the privileged information submitted for in camera 
review would never be revealed to plaintiffs, because it would 
necessarily be insufficient to establish an antitrust crime. If the 
court were still suspicious of the settlement after reviewing the 
privileged evidence, and believed that the totality of the 
evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of an 
antitrust violation, it could allow examination of privileged 
documents deemed to be “in furtherance” of the crime.80 
The production of such otherwise privileged documents to 
the party challenging a reverse payment settlement does not 
resolve that challenge. It simply makes available a broader set 
of facts for assessing it. What the parties tell each other during 
settlement discussions is not always (or even often) what they 
are telling themselves internally. Thus, in order to really 
understand the true intent of parties to a reverse payment 
settlement, it might be necessary to discover their internal 
thought processes. However, the parties to the reverse payment 
settlement would retain their rights to prove in any way they 
considered appropriate that their settlement was reasonable or, 
at a minimum, not an intentional violation of the antitrust 
laws. 
Crime-fraud procedures are well established. They are 
reserved for exceptional circumstances, and would be here as 
well. Only where a plaintiff could demonstrate a prima facie 
case of antitrust violation would the crime-fraud exception be 
triggered, and only communications “in furtherance of” the 
violation could be discovered. If used carefully and judiciously 
as the third step in a multi-step process for analyzing reverse 
payment settlements, this mechanism would hold real potential 
for allowing litigants to get to the heart of disputed matters 
without need of the trial within a trial that has so terrified the 
courts to date. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
We believe our proposal responds to an important 
limitation in the manner in which courts assess reverse 
payments in the settlement of patent litigation in the drug 
field. Growing acceptance of a rule premised on the 
“exclusionary zone” of a patent is based on reasoning that is 
                                                          
 80. See Abbott Labs., 241 F.R.D. at 487, 490 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
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entirely circular. It presumes the validity of the patent, even 
though it was the very uncertainty of that issue that drove the 
reverse payment settlement. Our approach offers a more 
suitable and thorough analysis, while avoiding the 
countervailing risks of a “trial within a trial” which seems to 
have scared off most courts from undertaking any fulsome 
antitrust evaluation of reverse payment settlements. The 
approach proceeds in three phases: public data must first be 
examined; non-privileged, private information may then be 
examined as determined by the court; and finally, upon a real 
prima facie showing of potentially criminal behavior, attorney-
client privilege may be pierced and the examination permitted 
to include specific privileged documents that the court selects 
based on its in camera review. The inquiry can be stopped at 
any stage, if parties to the settlement make a sufficient 
showing of the bona fides of their agreement. On balance, this 
process ensures that principles of both the patent laws and the 
antitrust laws are considered, and put in harmony. 
 
